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The relationship and the balance of power between management
and labor have, for the most part, been governed in the United States
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). I The NLRA, enacted in
1935, and popularly known as the Wagner Act, 2 initially provided the
philosophical and mechanical framework for resolving issues between
management and labor. The NLRA provided that employees have the
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29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976). The legislative predecessor to the NLRA was the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), which was part of Roosevelt's New
Deal legislation. Hill, The National Labor Relations Act And The Emergence of Civil Rights
Law: A New PriorityIn FederalLabor Policy, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 299, 301-03 (1976).
Its purpose was to aid in the nation's economic recovery from the Great Depression. W. ORERER,
K. HANSLOWE & J. ANDERSEN, LABOR LAW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SocIETY 110 (2d
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as W. OBEREs]. To effectuate its purpose, the NIRA established a fair
competition code which was to eliminate competition thereby stabilizing the depressed economy.
Id. The NIRA met its demise in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
In Schechter, the Supreme Court held that the NIRA was unconstitutional because the effect of
the various codes of fair competition was to "destroy the distinction ... between commerce
'among the several states' and the internal concerns of a State." Id. at 550.
Despite the fact that the NIRA was declared invalid, and despite its short-lived existence,
the NIRA did provide a framework for the NLRA. W. OBERzis, supra, at 110. Section 7(a) of the
NIRA provided in part:
(1) [t]hat employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interferences,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of
such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
(2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition
of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or
assisting a labor organization of his own choosing. ...
48 Stat. 198-99. This section was incorporated into § 9 of the NLRA. See Madden, Origin and
Early Years of the National Labor Relations Act, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 571, 576-77 (1967).
2 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)). The popular name for the Act was derived from its principal sponsor
in the Senate. A. MYERS & D. TWOMEY, LABOR LAW AND LEGISLATION 98 (5th ed. 1975).
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right to organize and to be represented by labor organizations, 3 to
have those unions bargain for them collectively, 4 and to engage in
other concerted activity.' It protected employees from actions by
employers, known as unfair labor practices, which were aimed at
obstructing or intimidating employees from forming, joining, or acting on behalf of labor organizations. 6 As further protection, the Act 7
required employers to bargain with the labor organizations which
represented a majority of its employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit.8
The Act was amended in 1947 by the Labor-Management Relations Act, which is also known as the Taft-Hartley Act. 9 One of the

29 U.S.C. § 157. Before the NLRA was enacted, employees did not have such a right. See
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In fact, as
both Adair and Coppage point out, an employer could, as a condition of employment, mandate
that an employee sign an agreement, popularly known as a yellow-dog contract, that he would
not join a labor organization. 236 U.S. at 14; 208 U.S. at 175. The NLRA sought to remedy that
situation and to promote a more equal labor bargaining position. W. OBEREar, supra note 1, at
110.
29 U.S.C. § 157. See generally Comment, National Labor Relations Act Section 7:
Protecting Employee Activity Through Implied Concert of Action, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 813
(1981).
5 29 U.S.C. § 157. These rights accrued to any person who was classified as an "employee"
within the meaning of the NLRA. Employee was defined as:
includ[ing] any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other
regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse.
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976)). See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
6 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8(1)-(4), 49 Stat. 445, 452-53 (1935)(current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1976)).
As used hereinafter, "Act" refers to the NLRA.
' National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 8 (5), 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935)(current version at
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976)).
Exactly what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit has been the subject of a great deal
of controversy. For a comprehensive discussion of the problem, see J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER &
A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARCAINING UNIT (1981). The Act itself provides
that the determination of the appropriateness of such a unit rests with the National Labor
Relations Board. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 9(b), 49 Stat. 449, 454 (1935)(current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976)): see AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 405-06 (1940).
' Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)). One of the reasons which prompted the Amendments was public fear
that the original NLRA had given the unions too much power. A. MYERs & D. TWOMEY, supra
note 2, at 99. It was thought that as a result there would be inflationary repercussions, especially
in light of the fact that this country was recovering from World War II. Id.
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significant changes made by the Taft-Hartley Amendments was the
addition of prohibitions against certain coercive unfair practices engaged in by labor organizations.' 0 The NLRA was amended again in
1959 by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act." A major change
resulting from this Amendment was to protect union members from
the possible corruption of union leaders and 2from other actions which
disregarded their rights as union members.'
These three major statutes constitute the current NLRA. The
purpose of the NLRA is to promote the process of collective bargaining, 13 by providing a vehicle to assist management and labor in reaching amicable resolutions of their problems.' 4 Before the bargaining
process can commence, however, it is necessary to determine the
representative groups on each side of the dispute. The respective
management and labor teams need to be clearly delineated. Yet,
history has shown that such determinations are not always simple or
straightforward, especially in the area of exactly who constitutes an
employee. For example, the Wagner Act definition of "employee" did

10Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 8(b), 61 Stat. 136, 141-42 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976)). See generally Luxembourg & Roberts, Unfair Labor
Practices Under The Taft-Hartley Act-A Comparative Study, 14 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1948);
Schwab, Union Security Agreements and Title VII: The Scope And Effect Of The New Section
19 Of The National Labor Relations Act, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1982).
1 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat.
519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)). This Act contains the infamous "'bill
of rights" for union members, and seeks to regulate internal union affairs. For discussions of the
impact of this Act, see Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting And Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARV. L. REV. 851 (1960); Heyden, Landrum-Griffin Section 101(a)(4) - Its Impact on Employee Rights, 7 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 643 (1981); McKee, Section 501(c) of the LMRDA: In
Search Of The Elements Of The Offense, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 218 (1982); Smith, The LaborManagement Reporting And DisclosureAct Of 1959, 46 VA. L. REv. 195 (1960).
12 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
§ 101(a)(1), 73 Stat. 519, 522 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1976)).
'3As expressed in its preamble:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151.
14 Management and labor have not always enjoyed a harmonious existence. Before Congress
began to legislate in this area, employers generally had the upper hand in their relationship with
employees. A. MERas & D. TwomEY, supra note 2, at 1-2. The laws enacted by Congress were
intended to equalize the respective bargaining positions of management and labor but this is not
to say that the legislation always improved the employer-employee relations.
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not mention supervisors. '5 In light of this void, the Supreme Court, in
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,' 8 determined that foremen could
join and assist labor organizations. 7 Justice Douglas, in his dissent,
eloquently described how this could not logically be the policy of the
Act or the intention of Congress.' 8 Justice Douglas began by expressing the philosophy behind labor law and the actors who participate in
negotiations. 19 He noted that if foremen are in fact "employees," as
defined in section 2(3) of the Act, 20 then virtually everyone who works
for a company would be considered an employee within the meaning
of the Act. 2' If everyone who collected a paycheck from the company
were an "employee," then there would be little left of what most
thought constituted management. 22 Justice Douglas questioned
whether Congress intended "such a basic change in industrial philoso24
phy"2 3 when it enacted the NLRA.
The next year, Congress in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, followed Justice Douglas' lead and amended the definition of "em-

5 See supra note 5. In this regard, it is important to remember that it is the National Labor
Relations Board that determines which employees should be in a certain bargaining unit and
therefore, in the absence of statutory guidance, the Board was left to decide whether to include
supervisors. See supra note 8; see also NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 134
(1944); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 165-66 (1940).
' 330 U.S. 485 (1947). The foremen involved in the Packard case were responsible for
ensuring the quality and quantity of the product manufactured in the plant. Id. at 487. The
foremen wanted to join a union, and the company argued that the NLRA did not compel "it to
recognize the union." Id. at 487, 490. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to
preclude foremen from unionizing. Id. at 490-91. For a short commentary on Packard, see
Recent Decisions, National Labor Relations Act-Supervisory Employees Entitled to Representation by Independent Union as Collective Bargaining Unit, 33 VA. L. REV. 214 (1947).
1" 330 U.S. at 490-91.
18 Id. at 493-501 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas was joined in his dissent by the
Chief Justice and Justice Burton. Id. at 493 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice
Frankfurter joined part of the dissent, and expressed no opinion on the other part. Id. at 501
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 493-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

11 330 U.S. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas maintained that the real dividing
line in labor matters is not management versus employees; rather, the line is between "the
operating group on the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group on the other." Id.
Further, he held that if foremen truly were employees, then the only company workers who
were not employees would be the directors of the company. Id. Indeed, then "vice-presidents,
managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents . . .[even] the president," would be an employee. Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

24 Id. Justice Douglas also expressed concern that foremen were also considered employers
under the Act. Id. at 497 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This confusion, in his opinion, resulted
because Congress, at the time of the enactment of the NLRA, had not considered the position
which foremen occupy in the workforce. Id. at 499-500 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ployee" so as to exclude supervisors.2 5 Aside from individuals explicitly
excluded by the Act from the definition of employee, and therefore
from appropriate bargaining units, certain other groups of employees
traditionally have been excluded by the National Labor Relations
Board.2 6 Specifically, managerial employees2 7 and confidential employees 28 have been excluded by the Board.
The exclusion of managerial employees was upheld by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.29 In Bell Aerospace, the
25 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 2(3), 61 Stat. 136, 137-38
(current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)(1976)). Supervisors had, prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, at times
been excluded from a bargaining unit. 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 93-94 & nn. 84 & 85 (1939). In
Douglas Aircraft Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 784 (1943), the Board held that supervisors were generally
excluded from a bargaining unit if the supervisors could promote, hire, fire, or discharge others.
Id. at 787; see Comment, Will The Real Managerial Employees Please Stand Up?, 9 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 92, 94-95 (1975); Recent Developments, The National Labor Relations Board
Redefines and Restricts the Scope of ManagerialEmployee Classification, 26 VANO. L. REV. 850,
851-52 (1973).
Indeed, Congress defined supervisors separately in § 2(11) of the Taft-Hartley Act. LaborManagement Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 2(11), 61 Stat. 136, 138 (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 152(11)(1976)). At the time that Congress was deciding the precise word to use in its
definition, there was a fundamental difference between the Senate's version and that of the
House of Representatives. Compare S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12)(1947), reprinted in 1
NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, 41 (1948) (no
reference to confidential employees) [secondary source hereinafter cited as I LEGISLATIVE HisTORY] with H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12)(1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra, at 39-40 (confidential employees specifically mentioned). The Senate's version was ultimately enacted. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between the two bills, see infra
notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive discussion of the
employees traditionally excluded by the Supreme Court, see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 275-79'(1974).
27 Managerial employees were, even prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, excluded
from the bargaining units of rank and file members. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
1317, 1320 (1946) (Board "customarily excluded from bargaining units of rank and file workers
executive employees who are in a position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policies"); accord J. P. Friez & Sons, 47 N.L.R.B. 43 (1943). After passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act, the Board declared that all workers, "allied" with management would not be considered
"'employees" within the meaning of the Act. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 753, 753-54 (1956). That
interpretation continued until Bell Aerospace Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971). See infra note 29
and accompanying text.
2 The Board excluded confidential employees because of its belief that management ought
not to be placed in the untenable position of bargaining with employees who have advance
knowledge of labor matters. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946); Bethlehem Steel
Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 854, 856 (1945); Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944); Western Union
Tel. Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 492, 499-500 (1942); Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108, 110
(1941). The House of Representatives' proposed bill defined a confidential employee as a worker
"who by the nature of his duties is given by the employer information that is of a confidential
nature, and that is not available to the public, to competitors, or to employees generally, for the
use in the interest of the employer." H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (1947), reprinted in
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 25, at 41. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
29 416 U.S. 267 (1974). In Bell Aerospace, a union petitioned the Board for a representation
election. Id. at 269. The bargaining unit was to be comprised of the company's buyers. Id. Bell
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Court concluded that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Amendments, in which Congress assumed that managerial employees
were excluded from the Act, 30 and the Board's previous exclusion of
managerial employees from bargaining units, 31 mandated the decision
that employees were not entitled to the Act's protection once it was
determined that they were "managerial. ' 32 More recently, the Supreme Court dealt with the parameters of the confidential employee
exemption in NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
33
Corp.
Whether the Board or courts are dealing with individuals classified as "confidential" or "managerial," the basic policy determination
underlying the decision to exclude the employee from the Act's protection and coverage is an attempt to delineate those individuals who
should appropriately be on management's team and those who should
appropriately be on labor's team. 34 Therefore, individuals whose interests are closely allied with management should not be included
within collective bargaining units which could be represented by a
labor organization. 35 Management should not be forced to develop
Aerospace Company opposed the petition, arguing that the buyers were managerial employees
and were therefore excluded from the Act. Id. The Board determined that the buyers constituted
an appropriate unit, in spite of the fact that the Board thought that the buyers were managerial
employees. Id. at 270-71. The Board certified the union after the union won an election among
the buyers. Id. at 271.
The same day, however, the Eighth Circuit court decided NLRB v. North Ark. Elec.
Coop., 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971). The Eighth Circuit held that managerial employees were
not "employees" within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 604. Thus, Bell Aerospace moved for
reconsideration of the Board's decision that the employees constituted an appropriate bargaining
unit but the Board denied the motion. 416 U.S. at 272. The Eighth Circuit, however, denied
enforcement of the Board's order, and the Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for
certiorari. Id. at 273-74.
'0 416 U.S. at 279-84. The Court noted that "[t]he legislative history strongly suggests that
there also were other employees, much higher in the managerial structure [than the buyers], who
were likewise regarded as so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision was
thought necessary." Id. at 283.
Id. at 275-79; see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
I'
3 416 U.S. at 290. The Court, however, remanded the case to the Board for a determination
of whether the buyers were, in fact, managerial employees. Id. at 289-90. It seems that the
Board had assumed, without explicitly stating, that the buyers were managerial employees. Id.
at 270-71. The Court directed the Board to make a factual determination about the status of the
buyers, and to discover whether the workers in question were "sufficiently high in the managerial hierarchy to constitute true 'managerial employees.' " Id. at 273. On remand, the Board
determined that the buyers involved were not managerial employees. Bell Aerospace, Co., 219
N.L.R.B. 384, 387 (1975).
3 454 U.S. 170 (1981). See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
'4 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
But see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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and implement policies through employees potentially loyal to a union 36 nor should unions be forced to represent employees aligned with
management. 37 Establishing the appropriate "teams" raises questions
of loyalties and alliances which are not easy to resolve. Hendricks was
concerned with how the definition of confidential employees should
incorporate the concept of alliance, i.e., how narrowly or broadly the
3
exception should be drawn.
The precise question addressed in Hendricks was whether an
employee, who in the course of employment may have access to
information considered confidential by his or her employer is implicitly excluded from the definition of "employee" contained in section
2(3) of the Act," and thus denied all protections under the Act. 40 The

36 See, e.g., Denver Dry Goods Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1175 (1947); J. P. Friez & Sons, 47
N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943); see also Note, "Managerial Employee": A Label In Search Of A
Meaningful Definition, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 435, 436 (1979), wherein the commentator notes that
if managerial employees are protected by the Act:
The interests of rank-and-file employees also may be adversely affected if employees
who share the interests of management are included in units of employees having
traditional interests in protecting or improving their terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, many managerial employees already have substantial bargaining
power with employers, because of their special expertise and value to the business.
Id. at 436.
3 See Montgomery Ward & Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 69, 73 (1941); see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
38 454 U.S. at 171-72; see infra notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text.
39 The current version of the definition of an employee does not expressly exclude confidential employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). In full, it reads:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to
the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any
individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of
an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor or any
individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, . . . as
amendedfrom time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein
defined.
Id. (emphasis added).
40 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956) ("persons who assist and act
in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management
policies in the field of labor relations" not entitled to be in bargaining unit); Hoover Co., 55
N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944) (employees "who in the normal performance of their duties may
obtain advance information of the Company's position with respect to contract negotiations, the
disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters" should not be in unit).
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question obviously centers around how broadly the confidential employee exclusion should be drawn.
Most employing entities would argue that all employees who use
or even have access to any confidential information of their employer,
including financial data, patents or trade secrets, and any other data
that the employer would not wish his competitors to know, should be
considered confidential and excluded from the Act's protection. 41 On
the other hand, one might assert that the confidential employee exclusion should only exclude those employees who have access to information not normally available to a labor organization and which a union
42
could use against management in a collective bargaining situation.
Under this latter interpretation, employees with access to confidential
business information might not be considered to be confidential employees excluded from the Act's coverage, but could nonetheless be
discharged for a knowing breach of confidentiality. 43 In Hendricks,
the Board argued that the correct definition of confidential employee
was the latter, narrow exclusion of employees with a labor nexus to
which the Board claimed it had consistently adhered since 1937. 44 The
employers, on the other hand, urged that those employees with access
to information confidential to the employee's company should be
excluded from the protection of the Act and the collective bargaining
45
process.
The Hendricks decision was the result of the consolidation of two
Seventh Circuit decisions. One involved a personal secretary to the

41 E.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1979) (included computer
operators); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1968) (included secretaries); NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963) (included insurance
agents); Kleinberg, Kaplan, Wolff, Cohen & Burrows, P.C., 253 N.L.R.B. 450 (1980) (included
clerical and support staff of law firm); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 162 (1979)
(included credit reporters); Pullman Standard Div. of Pullman, Inc., 214 N.L.R.B. 762 (1974)
(excluded computer operators).
42 This formulation is a restatement of the classic "labor-nexus" test. The Board has consistently adhered to this test. Perhaps the most oft-cited definition of the labor-nexus test is
embodied in the Board's decision in Hoover Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1944). There it was noted:
"[M]anagement should not be required to handle labor relations matters through employees who
are represented by the union with which the Company is required to deal with regard to contract
negotiations, the disposition of grievances, and other labor relations matters." Id. at 1323; see
also B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956); Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317,
1322 (1946).
13 See, e.g., International Business Machs. Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 107 (1982) (knowing dissemination of confidential wage information grounds for discharge and not violative of Act).
4 454 U.S. at 173; see supra note 43 and accompanying text; see also Lederer, Management's
Right to Loyalty of Supervisors, 32 LAB. L.J. 83, 88-93 (1981); Comment, supra note 25, at 95;
Note, supra note 36, at 436-39; Recent Developments, supra note 25, at 853.
41 454 U.S. at 186.
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general manager of a company; 46 the other involved another compa47
ny's clerical, technical, and professional employees.
The first case was Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
Corp. v. NLRB, 48 in which Mary Weatherman, the secretary to the
company's chief executive, 49 was discharged from her job in May,
1971, several days after she had signed a petition. That petition sought
the reinstatement of a co-worker and close friend, who had lost an
arm while at work for Hendricks. 50 Hendricks had denied the injured
employee reemployment and continued to do so after the petition. 51
Weatherman filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
52
NLRB alleging that her discharge violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

46

Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. NLRB, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980),

rev'd and remanded, 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
17 Malleable Iron Range Co. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
48 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
49 Id. at 767. Mary Weatherman had been employed by the company for a total of nine
years, and she had been the secretary to the general manager for the last four years. 454 U.S. at
172. In her job capacity, Weatherman's responsibilities included the processing of insurance and
accident claims. 627 F.2d at 771 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). She was also responsible for performing general clerical duties and answering the phone. 454 U.S. at 174 n.5 (citing Hendricks
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. 247 N.L.R.B. 498, 498-99, enforcement denied, 627
F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 454 U.S. 170 (1981)).
50 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1617-18 (1978),
rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979). The petition had been circulated among the
employees, and was ultimately sent to the Board of Directors at Hendricks. Id. at 1617. In
essence, the people whose signatures appeared on the petition were requesting the directors to
allow the injured party to return to work because of the latter's desire to do so, and because the
employee had been a "model" employee when he did work for the company. Id.
Id. The company's reasons for refusing to rehire the injured employee were not made part
I5
of the record.
52 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 8 of the Act refers to employer and union unfair
labor practices. Id. § 158. Section 8(a) specifically refers to those situations in which an action
taken by an employer would constitute an unfair labor practice. It protects employees' rights by
making it an unfair labor practice for the employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§ 7]." Id. § 158(a)(1). An employee's
exercise of § 7 rights-the right to join and participate in labor unions-is generally referred to as
protected concerted activity. See Johnson, Protected Concerted Activity In The Non-Union
Context: Limitations On The Employer's Rights To Discipline Or Discharge Employees, 49
Miss. L.J. 839 (1978).
Indeed when Weatherman filed a charge with the Board, she was alleging that she was
fired in retaliation for signing the petition, see Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership
Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1616 (1978), rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979),
which signing has been recognized as protected concerted activity. See, e.g., NLRB v. PepsiCola Bottling Co., 449 F.2d 824, 830 n.5 (5th Cir. 1971); Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n,
224 N.L.R.B. 574 (1976). Such employee allegations of retaliatory discharge are not at all
uncommon. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Interboro Contractors, Inc., 338 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967). If the Board determines that a
discharge did constitute an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8(a)(1), it may order
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Hendricks' defense was that Weatherman was a confidential secretary
and therefore, impliedly excluded from the NLRA's definition of em3
ployee contained in section 2(3).5
This contention was rejected by the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). 54 The ALJ determined that Weatherman was not a confiden5
tial secretary under the test used by the Board in B.F. Goodrich Co.
The B.F. Goodrich test excludes "from bargaining units as confidential employees persons who assist and act in a confidential capacity to
persons who formulate, determine, '56and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations."
Although the individual for whom Weatherman worked, the
general manager, attended the management-union contract negotiation meetings, he disclaimed responsibility for formulating or determining management policy. 57 The ALJ felt that his "passive role in
labor and employee relations matters... obviously reflect[ed] on the
58
assertedly 'confidential' character of Weatherman's employment.
The ALJ also felt that it was significant, in determining Weatherman's status as a confidential employee, that she did not deal with any
materials concerning labor relations. 59 Weatherman neither opened

the employee made whole by reinstatement with back pay. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); see infra note 66
and accompanying text. For an overview of unfair labor practice charges and their effect, see
Luxemberg & Roberts, supra note 10; Comment, Collective Bargaining and the Taft-Hartley
Labor Act, 33 VA. L. REv. 549 (1947).
-3 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1618-19 (1978),
rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979). For the text of § 2(3), see supra note 39.
54 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1620 (1978), rev'd
and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979).
55 115 N.L.R.B. 722 (1956). B.F. Goodrich involved whether certain employees, accountants, buyer-expediters, and secretaries, could properly be included in a bargaining unit. Id. at
723. The company argued that those employees were confidential employees and should be
excluded from the unit. Id. at 724. The Board refused to broaden the Ford Motor Co., 66
N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946), definition of confidential employees. 115 N.L.R.B. at 724; see infra
text accompanying note 56.
56 115 N.L.R.B. at 724.
51 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), rev'd
and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979). Had the company been able to prove that Weatherman's boss was involved with labor negotiations, it would have been easier for them to then show
that Weatherman was privy to such information, thus arguably bringing her within the Board's
labor-nexus test. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
There had been testimony that the general manager " 'formulat[ed] management policies
with regard to labor relations,' " 236 N.L.R.B. at 1619, but he was not actively involved in these
pursuits. Id. Further, the labor information that he did have was placed in a personal file behind
his desk. Id. at 1619-20. There was no evidence that Weatherman ever knew such a file existed.
Id.
, Hendricks County Rural Elee. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), rev'd
and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979).
51 Id. at 1620.
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nor even saw letters to or from union representatives.6 0 She did not
place phone calls, attend board or internal management meetings, or
act with respect to labor, personnel, or payroll matters.6 ' For these
reasons, the ALJ found that Weatherman did not fall into the exception drawn by the Board for confidential employees and was, therefore, an employee protected under the Act."'
The ALJ further found that Weatherman's termination was due
63
to her concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection.
Weatherman and her conferees, in urging Hendricks to reinstate the
injured employee, "might have paved the way for their own return to
work in similar circumstances. 6 4 Thus, by terminating Weatherman,
Hendricks had interfered with her right to engage in protected activity, in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act.65 The ALJ, therefore,
66
ordered that Weatherman be reinstated with back pay.
On appeal, the Board affirmed the decision by the ALJ. 7 Hendricks then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.68
60 Id. at 1619.
61 Id. The only labor-related letters that Weatherman typed were notices to Hendricks'
attorneys of the dates of negotiation meetings. Id. Further, there was testimony that any mail
addressed to the general manager that did contain labor information was delivered directly to
him. Id.
11 Id. at 1619-21. The ALJ discussed two circuit court opinions that had held that confidential employees were not protected by the Act. Id. at 1619. In NLRB v. Wheeling Elec. Co., 444
F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1971), and Peerless of Am., Inc., v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1112 (7th Cir.
1973), the Fourth and Seventh Circuit courts held that such employees were not entitled to
§ 8(a)(1) safeguards, and denied enforcement of the Board's orders. Hendricks County Rural
Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 25
(7th Cir. 1979).
83 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1618 (1978), rev'd
and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979). The company alleged that Weatherman's employment had been terminated because she had lied to her boss regarding the injured employee's
doctor's form. Id. at 1617-18. Apparently he had requested the original of the form, and
Weatherman told him that she had already mailed it to the insurance company. Id. In fact,
however, the form had not been sent, and Weatherman thereafter discovered the missing
document in the file. Id. She was fired four days later. Id. When Weatherman was told about
her job termination, he told her that she was fired for "fibbing." Id. The ALJ, however, did not
believe that the company had fired her because of that incident, but rather for having signed the
petition which the general manager found out about two days later. Id.
6 Id. at 1620.
85 Id. at 1621; see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
68 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), rev'd
and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979); see 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); supra note 52.
67 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1616 (1978), rev'd
and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979). Procedurally, the typical labor case commences
when a complaint is filed by either management or labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). A hearing is
then held before an ALJ. Id. The hearing is an adversarial one, and the ALJ ultimately rules on
the complaint. Id. There is an absolute right of appeal to the National Labor Relations Board.
Id. § 160(c). Following the Board's decision, an absolute right to appeal to any circuit court of
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The court agreed that the signing of a petition of this sort by an
employee constituted protected concerted activity,6 but it did not
agree that Weatherman was an "employee." 7 ° Although the ALJ had
correctly applied the B.F. Goodrich standard,' 7 the court found the
use of that standard to be an error of law. 72 It therefore remanded the
case to the Board for a determination of whether Weatherman handled confidential information for Hendricks. 73
The Board accepted remand of the case in spite of the fact that it
did not agree with the Seventh Circuit court's analysis of the law.74
Applying the standard suggested by the Seventh Circuit, 75 the Board
found, based on the prior record, that Weatherman did not deal with
any type of confidential information. 7 Even the minutes of the meetings of Hendricks' Board of Directors which she transcribed were not
considered confidential by the Board. 77 In support of this position, the
Board noted that Hendricks' status as a cooperative required that "all
members presumably have access to documents such as the minutes of
' 78
board meetings.
Hendricks appealed and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement. 7 In denying enforcement because the Board had not reopened

appeals exists. Id. § 160(e), (f). After a decision at the appellate level, a party may then petition
the United State Supreme Court for certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) (1976). The above is, of
course, a simplified account of the procedure followed. Section 10 of the Act details alternate
methods. See 29 U.S.C. § 160.
61 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979).
6 Id. at 28.
70 Id. The inquiry was whether Weatherman fit the § 2(3) definition of employee. Id. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71 See supra note 40.
72 603 F.2d at 28. Instead, the Seventh Circuit court mandated that the Board use the Bell
Aerospace analysis. Id. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. The court concluded that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act required the
conclusion that all confidential secretaries were excluded by the Act irrespective of their labor
nexus. 603 F.2d at 29; see infra notes 81, 82 & 99 and accompanying text.
71 603 F.2d at 30.
74 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 498, enforcement denied, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 454 U.S. 170 (1981). The Board did not
take further testimony or evidence; it reviewed the decision with the facts already on record. Id.
at 499.
1, See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
76 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 498, 499, enforcement
denied, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
7 Id. See infra text accompanying note 78.
18 Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 247 N.L.R.B. 498, 499 n.8, enforcement denied, 627 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd and remanded, 454 U.S. 170 (1981). The Board
adopted the position of the ALJ. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236
N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979).
70 627 F.2d at 768.

502

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:490

the record in order to obtain further evidence, the Seventh Circuit
court held:
If we had believed that the prior record was sufficient to support a
finding under the Bell Aerospace standard, we would not have
remanded the proceeding to the Board ....

When an erroneous

standard for the admission of evidence is used, it follows almost
mandatorily that a new record is needed, not only to add evidence
in patchwork fashion but also possibly to rehear all the relevant
evidence under the different admission standard. 80
The Seventh Circuit confirmed that it would adhere to its analysis of
Bell Aerospace which mandated that confidential employees be "excluded from coverage [under the Act] under a 'broad definition' not
limited to those having a labor nexus. '""s
80Id. at 770. The company apparently felt that based upon the first Seventh Circuit court
opinion, there was sufficient evidence based upon the record below to warrant a finding that
Weatherman was not an employee within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 768. It did, however,
state that if the Board did not share this view, the company was entitled to the opportunity to
present further evidence on the matter. Id.
81 627 F.2d at 768 (citing Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 284 n.12). The Seventh Circuit
discussed at great length its standard of review, noting that it was "not at liberty to go behind an
opinion [of the Supreme Court] or its clear implications on the ground that the Supreme Court
'was not fully apprised by counsel in that case as to the legislative history.' " Id. at 760 (quoting
United States v. Russell, 461 F.2d 605, 608 (10th Cir. 1972)). In this respect, the Seventh Circuit
correctly held that it was not free to disregard a Supreme Court decision. Id. at 768. The court of
appeals did not adhere to the Board's view that Bell Aerospace's discussion of confidential
employees was dictum, id., nor did it think that NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980),
was controlling. 627 F.2d at 769.
The Yeshiva decision involved faculty members of the university who had filed a representation petition with the Board. 444 U.S. at 674-75. The university opposed the petition, arguing
that the faculty personnel were not covered by the Act because they were either supervisors or
managers. Id. at 675. The Supreme Court held that the faculty members at Yeshiva University
were managerial employees and thus were excluded from coverage under the Act. Id. at 691.
It seems, therefore, that the Seventh Circuit court was correct in ruling that Yeshiva was not
controlling on Hendricks. 627 F.2d at 769. Yeshiva dealt with professionals in an academic
environment. 444 U.S. at 679-80. The issue in Yeshiva was whether those professionals were
managerial employees. Id. at 675. Hendricks, however, dealt with whether employees were
confidential employees. 627 F.2d at 767.
Judge Cudahy dissented from the majority opinion in Hendricks. 627 F.2d at 770 (Cudahy,
J., dissenting). Although he expressed no opinion as to Yeshiva's applicability, he felt that Bell
Aerospace's discussion regarding confidential employees was, at best, dictum. Id. at 771-72
(Cudahy, J., dissenting). It was his belief that the circuit court was creating an entirely new
body of law based on this dictum. Id. Judge Cudahy also did not feel that the Board's failure to
receive additional evidence in the case warranted a denial of enforcement of the Board's order.
Id. at 770 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). He stated:
While it might have been more politic for the Board to have reopened the
hearing, the Company argues only one specific fact which it would have tried to
establish during such a reopening: the Company's "involve[ment]" in "three (3)
litigation cases" (presumably with a competitive investor-owned utility). There is
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The second Seventh Circuit decision, Malleable Iron Range Co.
v. NLRB, 82 also arose out of a decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and dealt with the proper construction of the confidential employee exclusion. 83 In December, 1978, the Office and
Professional Employees International Union sought to be certified as
the collective bargaining agent of certain clerical, technical, and professional employees employed at a facility of Malleable Iron Range
Company.8 4 Malleable contended that eighteen of the employees had
access to confidential information concerning business matters, not
necessarily labor relations material, 8 5 and on that basis, as well as
87
others, 86 opposed their inclusion in the requested bargaining unit.
The Board decided that none of the eighteen employees were confidential employees because they did not pass the "labor-nexus" test.88
Malleable did not claim that these employees met that "labornexus" test, but rather argued that they had worked with or had
access to information which the company did not want released to the
public or to its competitors.8 9 For example, they pointed out that
certain of the employees in question were technical service engineers,
who tested company appliances against industry code specification
and made changes necessary to ensure compliance.90 These employees
had knowledge of product specifications, manufacturing costs, and
test results. 9' Further, other employees had access to price quotations
92
from suppliers or cost and profit margin information.

slight likelihood that this "new fact" would materially change the basis for evaluating Weatherman's status as a "confidential secretary." The fact is that Weatherman's
status was well explored and ventilated at the original hearing, and both we and the
Board should be able to reach the requisite conclusions based on that record.
Id.
82

631 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1980).
454 U.S. at 175-76.

84 244 N.L.R.B. 485, 486 (1979), enforcement denied, 631 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd

and remanded sub nom. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S.
170 (1981).
8' Id. at 487.
86 See Brief for National Labor Relations Board at 40 n.7, NLRB v. Hendricks Countv Rural

Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for NLRB].'
87 454 U.S. at 175.
88 Id. See supra note 42.
8 454 U.S. at 175. For other cases in which companies have made a similar argument, see
supra note 42.
'0 Brief for NLRB, supra note 86, at 10,
81 Id.
2 d. at 12-13,
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The union prevailed in the representation election and was certified as the bargaining agent for the unit. 3 In order to test the underlying findings of the Board in the representation matter, Malleable
refused to bargain with the union after the election. 4 As a result, the
union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board.9 5 The Board
found that Malleable's refusal to bargain was a violation of sections
97
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act 9 6 and issued a bargaining order.
Malleable petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
for review of that order and the Board cross-petitioned for enforcement.9 8 The Seventh Circuit, in an unreported decision, denied enforcement, noting that the Board should not have applied the labornexus test rejected by the Seventh Circuit in Hendricks.9 It, therefore,
remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration consistent with its
00
decision in Hendricks.
The Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for certiorari in
both Hendricks and Malleable, 10 to consider whether the Board's
labor-nexus test was appropriate, or whether all those employees who
have access to confidential information of their employers are ex0 3
cluded from the Act. 102 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,1
13 454 U.S. at 177. The purpose of a representation election is to determine whether an
unrecognized union has sufficient report to be certified as the representative of the involved
employees. W. OBERR, supra note 1, at 238.
11 454 U.S. at 175.
95Id. See supra note 52 and accompanying text,
(5). Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) provide:
9 454 U.S. at 175; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1),
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;

(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees.

Id.
As a general proposition, § 8(a)(1) is an all encompassing section; it can be violated
independently or in connection with § 7. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 30708 (1965). Further, a violation of § 8(a) (2)-(5), will necessarily be a violation of § 8(a)(1). Radio
Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-44 (1954). But see Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (closing of plant constituted § 8(a)(3) violation but did
not violate § 8(a)(1)).
11 454 U.S. at 175.
98Id.
99 Id. at 175-76.
'00 Id. at 176.
"01 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp. 450 U.S. 964 (1981).
102454 U.S. at 176. The Court was attempting to resolve the conflict in the circuit courts of
appeals. See supra note 62.
The Supreme Court also granted Hendricks' cross-petition for certiorari on the question of
whether Weatherman should have been excluded as "the functional equivalent of a personnel
department employee," thus not covered by the Act. 454 U.S. at 176 n.8. The Court, however,
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began by stating the standard of review followed by the Court when
reviewing decisions made by administrative bodies charged with con04
struction of a statute.'
The narrow standard of review used by the Court is derived from
two lines of authority. One concedes that the Board alone should
formulate the meaning of the term "employee." In NLRB v. Hearst
Publications,Inc., 105 for example, the Supreme Court held that Congress had delegated to the Board the task of determining whether
there was sufficient evidence present to warrant a finding of whether
a person was an "employee.' 10 6 In Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers
of America v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 107 the Court again upheld
the Board's right, subject to judicial review, to determine "the contours of the term 'employee.' ",01
The second line of cases supporting the Court's narrow standard
of review, deals with the deference accorded to the Board's decisions.
As an example, the Court, in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 09 stated that
the Board's judgments should be followed if its construction of a
statute is reasonably defensible." 0 It is only reasonably defensible,
however, if the correct legal standard is applied."'
In applying this limited standard of administrative review, the
Supreme Court examined the Board decisions before the 1947 TaftHartley Amendments, 112 the legislative history of the Amendments, "I
dismissed the writ of certiorari on the latter point as improvidently granted, since it presented
primarily an issue of fact. Id. The Court noted that the Seventh Circuit had held that the Board's
determination that Weatherman was not the "functional equivalent of a personnel department
employee" was supported by the evidence in the record. Id.
103 Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. 454 U.S.
at 171. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor and the Chief Justice,
concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 192 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
"I Id. at 177. The Board is charged with investigating and deciding labor-related matters. 29
U.S.C. § 160(c). In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 454 (1951), the Supreme Court
declared that the Board's findings would be upheld if supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole. Id. at 462. If, however, there appears to have been a gross abuse of discretion,
then the Board's decision will be reversed. Id. at 463.
05 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
...Id. at 130. In Hearst Publications, the Court considered whether newsboys who sold
papers were employees within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 113-14.
107 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
101Id. at 166.
10-441 U.S. 488 (1979).
110 Id. at 497.
"' Id. The Court also noted that it would not uphold the Board's decision if the Court found
that the decision "was 'fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the Act' and an attempt
to usurp 'major policy decisions properly made by Congress.' " Id. (quoting American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965)).
..
2 454 U.S. at 178-81; see infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
l13454 U.S. at 181-85; see infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
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and the subsequent case history." 4 Before beginning with an examination of Board decisional law prior to the Taft-Hartley Amendments,
the Court reviewed the objectives of the Wagner Act." 5 After noting
that the Wagner Act had broadly defined employees," 6 the Court
examined the line of decisions whereby the Board had narrowed the
Act's scope by excluding certain workers from bargaining units."'
Although the Court observed that confidential employees were not
specifically mentioned in the Wagner Act, I18 it noted that in accordance with the policy of the Act, the Board had carved out a category
of individuals who were to be excluded from collective bargaining
units as "confidential" employees." 9 The Court determined that the
Board had rejected, as early as 1940, the concept that all employees
with access to confidential information of any type should be excluded
from the definition of employee. 120 Between 1940 and 1946, the Board
decided at least fifty cases dealing with whether certain employees
should be excluded from collective bargaining units because of their
status as confidential employees.' 21 In his evaluation of these cases,
Justice Brennan stated that "the Board routinely applied the labornexus test in numerous decisions to identify individuals who were to
be excluded from bargaining units because of their access to confidential information.' 2 2
The Court regarded the 1940 to 1946 cases as developing a test,
which was consistently applied, although "refined slightly," 2 3 in Ford

"1 454 U.S. at 181-85; see infra notes 133-44 and accompanying text.
"5 454 U.S. at 178; see supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
lie See supra note 5.
454 U.S. at 178; see infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
454 U.S. at 178.
"1 Id. at 178-79. The Board had the ability to do so by using its authority to determine the
appropriateness of a bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b); see Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
330 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1947).
110454 U.S. at 178-79. The Court cited Bull Dog Elec. Prods. Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1940),
for this proposition. 454 U.S. at 178. In Bull Dog, the Board considered whether estimates in an
engineering department could be included in a bargaining unit. 22 N.L.R.B. at 1045. The Board
was unpersuaded by the company's argument that its employees handled sensitive confidential
company matters and held that these employees were protected by the Act. Id. at 1046. The
Court also cited Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 108 (1941), for the same idea. 454
U.S. at 178. In Creamery Package, the Board held that employees who did not have a direct
connection with labor information were not excluded from the Act. 34 N.L.R.B. at 110-11.
'
See 454 U.S. at 179-80 & n.11.
155 Id. at 179. The Court further noted that the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
NLRB v. Poultrymen's Serv. Corp., 138 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1943), approved as sound the Board's
test which examined the employee's access to "confidential information with respect to labor
relations." Id. at 210-11.
1 454 U.S. at 180.
"1
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Motor Co.1 24 In that case, said Justice Brennan, the Board narrowed
what had been the prevailing view and from that point forward
would only include within the definition of confidential employees
who
those who "assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons
' 25
exercise 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations.'
Whether the Board had a consistent practice of applying a labornexus test before the Taft-Hartley Amendments is relevant not only to
the establishment of a long-term practice, but also is of concern in
determining exactly what Congress believed the Board's policy to be
at the time of the Amendments. Thus,2 6 the Court examined the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The legislative history of Taft-Hartley did not discuss confidential employees in any detail, nor did it approve or disapprove the
Board's prior practice.1 27 The Court noted that the bill passed by the
House of Representatives had explicitly included confidential employees in the Act. 28 The Senate bill did not, however, include confiden-

66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946).
454 U.S. at 180-81 (quoting Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. at 1332).
126 Id. at 181-85.
Il Id.; see infra notes 128, 129, 131 & 132.
122 Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text. The House definition of "supervisor"
included any individual who, by the nature of his or her duties had access to information that
was of a confidential nature and that was not available to the public, to competitors, or to
employees generally, and was to be used only in the interest of the employer. H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(12) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 40-41.
"Supervisor" was defined as:
(12) The term 'supervisor' means any individual(A) who has authority, in the interest of the employer(i) to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, demote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline any individuals employed by the employer, or to
adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend any such action; or
124
11

(ii) to determine, or make effective recommendations with respect to the application of, the factors upon the basis of which the wages of any individuals
employed by the employer are determined, if in connection with the foregoing
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the exercise of independent judgment;
(B) who is employed in labor relations, personnel, employment, police, or timestudy matters, or in connection with claims matters of employees against employers,
or who is employed to act in other respects for the employer, in dealing with other
individuals employed by the employer, or who is employed to secure and furnish the
employer information to be used by the employer in connection with any of the
foregoing; or
(C) who by the natureof his duties is given by the employer information that is of a
confidential nature, and that is not available to the public, to competitors, or to
employees generally, for use in the interest of the employer.
Id. (emphasis added).
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tial employees in its definition of supervisor.1 2 In the Conference
Committee, which reconciled the two bills, the Senate version of the
definition of supervisor prevailed and confidential employees were not
mentioned.1 30 The House Manager's statement which was attached to
the Conference Report provided:
The conference agreement, in the definition of "supervisor," limits
such term to those individuals treated as supervisors under the
Senate amendment. In the case of persons working in labor relations, personnel and employment departments, it was not thought
necessary to make specific provision, as was done in the House bill,
since the Board has treated, and presumably will continue to treat,
such persons as outside the scope of the act. This is the prevailing
Board practice with respect to such people as confidential secretaries as well, and it was not the intention of the conferees to alter
1
this practice in any respect. 13

Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded, it was congressional intent not
to change Board practice as Congress understood that practice to
32
be. 1

121 S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 26, at 104. The Senate bill read:
The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment.
Id.
130 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
31 House CONF. REPORT, No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 25, at 505 (emphasis added). See infra note 134.
32 454 U.S. at 184-85. The Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history of § 2(11). Id.; see supra note 131. It concluded that since professional employees
were explicitly included in the Act, and most professional workers would be privy to the
confidential information of a business, Congress could not have intended to exclude all confidential employees from the Act's coverage. 454 U.S. at 184-85. In other words, if Congress had
intended to exclude confidential employees, regardless of whether those individuals handled
labor-related confidential material, then most of the professional employees would thereby be
excluded from the Act. That result would clearly not be what Congress had intended since it had
specifically provided for the inclusion of professionals. 29 U.S.C. § 162.
"1 454 U.S. at 186-90. In Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court noted: " 'Congress recognized
there were other persons so much more clearly "managerial" that it was inconceivable that the
Board would treat them as employees. Surely Congress could not have supposed that while
"'confidential secretaries" could not be organized, their bosses could be.' " 416 U.S. at 284
(quoting Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F. 2d 485, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1973), af.'d in part, rev'd
in part, and remanded, 416 U.S. 267 (1974)).
The Seventh Circuit understood Bell Aerospace to imply that Congress had misunderstood
the Board's policy in FordMotor Co. 603 F.2d at 29. Thus, when Congress stated that it did not
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The Court then examined footnote twelve from Bell Aerospace,
which the Seventh Circuit in Hendricks had felt constrained to follow. 1 33 That footnote read:
In 1946 in Ford Motor Co .,...

the Board had narrowed its

definition of "confidential employees" to embrace only those who
exercised " 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations."
The discussion of "confidential employees in both the House and
Conference Committee Reports, however, unmistakably refers to
that term as defined in the House bill, which was not limited just to
those in "labor relations." Thus, although Congress may have misconstrued recent Board practice, it clearly thought that the Act did
not cover "confidential
employees" even under a broad definition
34
of that term.

The Hendricks Court overruled this position of Bell Aerospace, stating
that it was dicta unnecessary to the determination in Bell Aerospace of
whether managerial employees should be included in the Act, and
further that the Bell Aerospace Court was in error concerning congressional intent. 135 The argument espoused by both the companies involved in Hendricks, was that the Board had not applied a consistent
labor-nexus test in determining whether employees should be excluded
as "confidential."' 13 The Hendricks Court, however, was not persuaded by the argument. 37 The Court viewed the restatement of the
labor-nexus test in B. F. Goodrich 38 as merely a reaffirmation of Ford
Motor Co., 139 "to limit the term confidential so as to embrace only
those who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who

intend to disturb Board policy, which excluded confidential secretaries, it assumed that the
exclusion of all confidential secretaries, not just those secretaries with a labor nexus, was the
Board policy. Id. Following the congressional intent, therefore, would mean excluding all
confidential secretaries. Id. at 29-30.
416 U.S. at 284 n.12 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
454 U.S. at 187. Justice Brennan observed that the question presented in Bell Aerospace
dealt with the inclusion within the Act of managerial employees. 454 U.S. at 187. Thus, any
discussion of confidential employees was unnecessary. Id.
In reexamining the language of the Conference Committee Report, see supra text accompanying note 131, Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he only plausible interpretation of the Report is that, in describing the Board's
prevailing practice of denying certain employees the full benefits of the Wagner Act,
the Report referred only to employees involved in labor relations, personnel and
employment functions, and confidential secretaries to such persons. For that, in
essence, is where the Board law as of 1947 stood.
454 U.S. at 188 (emphasis in original).
454 U.S. at 187-90.
"
Id. at 190.
13'See supra notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text.
11 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field
of labor relations."1 40 The Court found that the Board had followed a
consistent policy for over forty years which had been implicitly approved by Congress. 14 1 Congressional failure to amend this when it
amended the statute in the Landrum-Griffin Act 42 was, noted the
Court, entitled to evidentiary weight. 1 43 Based upon these findings,
the Court applied the labor-nexus test in Hendricks and Malleable.14
The minority in Hendricks took issue with some of the broad
45
statements of the majority. Justice Powell, writing for the minority,
pointed out that the labor-nexus test had not been consistently applied
by the Board. 14 He noted that in E.P. Dutton & Co., 47 the Board
excluded three secretaries from the collective bargaining unit without
mentioning a labor nexus. 48 Justice Powell continued to take issue
with the majority by agreeing with the legislative history as interpreted by the Court in Bell Aerospace. 49 The minority concluded that
140 454 U.S. at 188-89 (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956) (footnote
omitted and emphasis deleted)).
M41
Id. at 189-90.
"I See supra note 11.
113 This point was well stated in Bell Aerospace:
In addition to the importance of legislative history, a court may accord great weight
to the longstanding interpretation placed on a statute by an agency charged with its
administration. This is especially so where Congress has re-enacted the statute
without pertinent change. In these circumstances, congressionalfailure to revise or
repeal the agency's interpretationis persuasive evidence that the interpretationis the
one intended by Congress.
416 U.S. at 274-75 (emphasis added).
1 454 U.S. at 190-92. In Hendricks, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, and remanded
the case to the appellate court to enter an order enforcing the Board's order. Id. at 191. In
Malleable, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's holding regarding confidential employees,
but remanded the case to determine whether the employees should be excluded for other reasons.
Id. at 192.
145 See supra note 103.
l"I See 454 U.S. at 196 & n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147 33 N.L.R.B. 761 (1941).
148 454 U.S. at 196 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In E. P. Dutton,
the Board stated:
[W]e believe that private secretaries should be excluded where, as in the instant case,
one of the competing unions which may become the exclusive representative of
certain of the Company's employees is of the opinion that the personal and confidential relationship existing between the private secretaries, whom the Guild has not
attempted to organize, and the Company's officers is such as to create a possible
division of their loyalties between the management and the potential bargaining
agent.
33 N.L.R.B. at 767 n.8.
141 454 U.S. at 198 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell stated
that there was "no support whatever for the Board's position." Id. at 195-96 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). He maintained that Congress, in interpreting the pre1947 Board opinions, had thought that confidential employees, like supervisory employees,
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"[t]he 'labor nexus,' as increasingly narrowed by the Board and now
accepted by this Court, is antithetical to any common-sense view or
understanding of the role of confidential secretaries."'' 50
There was, however, some agreement between the majority and
minority opinions. Justice Powell agreed that the purpose of the TaftHartley Amendments was to exclude those individuals who were allied with management. 151 He further agreed that the definition of
confidential employee ought not to be "sweeping. ' 152 Justice Powell,
however, was of the opinion that Weatherman should be excluded
from the definition of confidential employees, and thus he dissented
53
from the majority opinion.1
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court merely reaffirmed
prior Board policy of utilizing a labor-nexus test, 154 its decision in
Hendricks does not appear to have much effect on the practical application of the confidential employee exception.' 5 5 One issue, however,
which remains open after Hendricks is which labor-nexus test should
56
be used by the Board.
The majority in Hendricks discussed in general terms the labornexus test that the Board applies. 57 The Court did not, however, shed
any light on which test ought to be applied; 58 it did not approve the
B.F. Goodrich test. It is not clear whether the Board's definition of
"confidential" employees 159 which requires the employee to assist one

would be excluded from the Act. Id. at 198 (Powell, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
150 Id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151Id. at 192 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra notes 27 & 28.
152 454 U.S. at 192 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"I Id. The minority also discussed the Board's request that the Court hold that even if a
confidential employee has a labor nexus, that employee cannot be discharged without running
afoul of the Act. Id. at 197 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell
noted that the majority had not chosen to address the issue, and he felt that its refusal was
correct. Id. In his opinion, if the Court were to accept the Board's theory it would be a "major
departure from the basic philosophy of the Act." Id.; see infra notes 179 & 180.
154 See supra note 42.
I'- The decision did, of course, end the aberrant behavior of the Seventh Circuit. See supra
note 72.
'51 See infra note 159.
15 454 U.S. at 178-81, 188-89.
"5 The ALJ in Hendricks did discuss the issue. See infra note 159.
1s See supra text accompanying note 56 for the Board's definition of a "confidential employee." The ALJ in Hendricks noted that the Board has used a two-part analysis in determining
if one is a confidential employee. First, it must be determined if the person acts in a "confidential" capacity; and second, it must be demonstrated that the assisted person formulates, determines, and effectuates labor policies. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236
N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979). This interpretation of the test is known as the "conjunctive" test and requires a finding of all of the elements and
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who formulated, determined, and effectuated labor-relations policy, 160 should be literally interpreted to require the conjunctive. It
could be more loosely interpreted, without changing the fundamental
policy, as requiring the assisted person to formulate, determine, or
effectuate labor relations policy.'"' It is submitted that the conjunctive
test, 6 2 requiring that all three elements be met, is in error, and that
the better test would be the latter, disjunctive test.'6 3 The issue should
not be whether a rigid conjunctive test has technically been fulfilled,
but rather whether the conclusion is consistent with the policy underlying the labor-nexus test.
As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Hendricks,'6 4 for
example, it was the labor-nexus policy rather than a strict application
of the B.F. Goodrich test that was applied by the Board in Pullman
Standard Division of Pullman, Inc.'1 5 In Pullman Standard, the employees in question developed financial estimates of construction costs
for which they regularly had "access to confidential information concerning labor costs and anticipated changes which were expected to
result from collective bargaining negotiations.' 6 6 Obviously, these
employees dealt with information that if available to a labor organization would greatly influence collective bargaining.' 6 7 The Board concluded that these individuals were "confidential employees" because
of the nature of the information to which they had access.' 6 8 It is clear

not merely one of them. See infra note 160. The ALJ, however, doubted the propriety of such a
test. 236 N.L.R.B. at 1619 n.8. In his opinion, it would be difficult to believe that an employee
who worked for someone who "formulate[d]" policy, but did not "effectuate" it would not be
considered a confidential employee. Id.
"0 Shayne Bros., 213 N.L.R.B. 1408 (1974); Weyerhauser Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1170, 1172
(1968).
10l That interpretation would be consistent with the disjunctive test that the Board uses when
determining whether an employee is a "supervisor." See Golden West Broadcasters- KTLA, 215
N.L.R.B. 760, 764 n.l (1974).
162 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
163 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
164454 U.S. at 189.

N.L.R.B. 762 (1974).
M00
Id. at 762-63.
107 Id. at 763. The Board stated:
165 214

We regard such employees as specially aligned with the employer's interests in the
area of labor relations, even absent the showing of a confidential work relationship
with a specifically identifiable managerial employee responsible for labor policy.
. . . Premature disclosure of this information obviously would reveal the Employer's
anticipated ultimate settlement figures and thus prejudice its bargaining strategy in
future negotiations.
Id.
168

Id.
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that Pullman Standard was a departure from the formula of B.F.
Goodrich, but it was not in any sense a departure from the labornexus policy and has not been broadly interpreted. 69
Since Hendricks, there has as yet been only one reported case
raising the issue of confidential employees, NLRB v. Rish Equipment
Co., 170 and that case involved the conjunctive test left open by the
Hendricks Court. In Rish, the employee in dispute was the secretary
to a manager who effectuated management policies.' 7 ' The manager
was involved in labor negotiations, although only to a minor extent
did he formulate and determine those policies.1 72 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that the B. F. Goodrich labornexus test, requiring that the management representative "formulate,
determine and effectuate" 173 these policies, was satisfied. 74 The court
did not, however, discuss whether all three management qualities
were required. 7 5 Thus, the issue of the conjunctive test is still open to
question.
Another issue left open by the Supreme Court in Hendricks is
whether confidential employees who pass the Board's labor-nexus test
are nevertheless afforded the protection of the Act. 76 The Court did
not answer that question since it determined that Weatherman was
not a confidential employee. 77 It is not clear, though, how the Court
will address this issue. Confidential employees are not considered
"employees" within the meaning of the Act. 78 It does not follow,
though, that those employees are not entitled to the protection of the

169 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 162 (1979) (Board refused to find that credit
reporters, who have access to confidential information are "confidential" employees); see also
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 9 (1971); cf. Pullman Standard, 214 N.L.R.B. at 763
(computer operators with access to confidential information are "confidential" employees).
170 687 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1982).
71 Id. at 37.
172 Id.
17' B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. at 725 (emphasis added).
174 687 F.2d at 37. The Fourth Circuit held that Hendricks was not controlling. Id. The court
interpreted Hendricks as merely approving the Board's labor-nexus test. Id. In Rish, unlike
Hendricks, the secretary was privy to labor-related materials. Id.
7-5 The dissenting judge in Rish argued that the conjunctive test should have been applied. Id.
at 38 (Hall, J., dissenting). He felt that there was a distinction between those who effectuate
labor policy and those who formulate or determine the policy. Id. Therefore, the secretary was
not a confidential employee, and Judge Hall would have enforced the Board's order. Id. at 39
(Hall, J., dissenting).
"' The Board has denied confidential employees with the requisite labor-nexus the right to
join bargaining units. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946); Hoover Co.,
55 N.L.R.B. 1321, 1323 (1944).
177454 U.S. at 191.
'7
See supra note 40.
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Act. 7 9 On the other hand, some courts have held that these confidential employees are not protected by the NLRA. s0
Although some issues remain open, 181 the Supreme Court's decision in Hendricks affirms the labor-nexus test long applied by the
Board. Whether another court or Congress will eventually recognize
that confidential employees, as that term is customarily used in the
business community, should be properly aligned with management,
only time will tell.

17 Indeed, the Board has held that such employees are entitled to the protection of the Act.
See Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 224 N.L.R.B. 574 (1976); Bethlehem Steel Co., 63
N.L.R.B. 1230 (1945); Poultrymen's Serv. Corp., 41 N.L.R.B. 444 (1942), enforced, 138 F.2d
204 (3d Cir. 1943). Additionally, the ALJ in Hendricks held that even if Weatherman had been a
confidential employee, she could not have been discharged for protected activity. Hendricks
County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 236 N.L.R.B. 1616, 1619 (1978), rev'd and remanded,
603 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1979). Justice Powell, however, disagreed with that determination. See
supra note 153.
A similar situation exists regarding the status of supervisors. Although supervisors are not
employees protected under the Act, they have been afforded some protection by the Board when
their discharge was part of a pattern of conduct intended to coerce employees who are exercising
their § 7 rights. See, e.g., NLRB v. Downslope Indus., 676 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1982) (reinstatement of supervisor discharged for protesting sexual harassment); Empire Gas Inc. of Denver, 254
N.L.R.B. 626 (1981) (atmosphere of coercion requires return to status quo ante); DRW Corp.,
248 N.L.R.B. 828 (1980)(supervisors protected from discharge when engaged in similar activities
as unlawfully discharged employees); Better Morkey Grip Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1170 (1956),
enforced, 243 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1957). But see Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No.
58 (June 23, 1982) (overruling "pattern of conduct" line of cases typified by DRW Corp.); cf.
NLRB v. Nevis Indus., 647 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1981) (pro-union activities of supervisors not
protected by Act); NLRB v. Southern Plasma Corp., 626 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1980) (supervisors
not entitled to protection of Act when they attempt to organize).
180See Hendricks, 603 F.2d at 28; supra note 62.
1"I A third issue involves the Bell Aerospace decision. Since the Court in Hendricks disapproved of the Bell Aerospace majority's interpretation of the legislative history of § 2(11), 454
U.S. at 186-90, it may be that very little is left of the Bell Aerospace decision, other than to say
that managers are indeed a "subcategory to those already excluded as supervisors." Comment,
supra note 25, at 123. Exactly what effect Hendricks has on managerial employees, though, will
and should be left for future determination.

